What right does Husserl have to insist that the original mode of encounter with beings, in which they appear to us as they are as things in themselves, is the encounter of consciousness purified by phenomenological reduction and its objects? “Whence and how is it determined what must be experienced as the ‘things themselves’ in accordance with the principle of phenomenology?” These are pressing questions which Heidegger might well have asked. Perhaps because of his reverence for Husserl, he does not subject him to direct criticism in his fundamental work. Nevertheless, Being and Time is itself a powerful critique of the Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger there gives attention to many different modes in which we exist and encounter things. He analyses the structures constitutive of things not only as they are encountered in the detached, theoretical attitude of consciousness, but also in daily life as “utensils” ( Zuhandene ) or in special moods, especially in anxiety ( Angst ). What is more, he exhibits there the structures that are constitutive of the particular kind of being which is the human being and which he calls “Dasein.” For Heidegger, it is not pure consciousness in which beings are originally constituted. The starting point of philosophy for him is not consciousness, but Dasein in its being.
This is a lecture course presented at the University of Freiburg
during summer semester 1942. The course is split into three parts.
First Heidegger looks for metaphysics in "The Ister",
then he returns to a passage of Sophocles' Antigone he had used,
more briefly, in a 1935 course, Introduction to Metaphysics .
Finally he examines more of "The Ister". Hölderlin's
poems have been translated especially for this book, to help
understand Heidegger's interpretation of the German.